Monday, September 22, 2008

The Road Down Which We Go, Has But One End.....A Cliff...

(above: Philadelphia, Pa. circa 2076)

"Race-mixing stems from self-loathing which one projects upon their own race. And then as a means to disassociate themselves from this hated race (the embodiment of their self-loathing) they choose a mate from a foreign race.
It's possible that they believe that by interbreeding and producing halflings they will, in effect, lessen this intense self-loathing by weakening the genetic code of their race of origin.

All things considered, participants of miscegenation are the most hateful of racists, in that they despise their own people!"
-H. Braun

The Following is exerted from, 'Critique of Liberal Ideology' by Alain de Benoist and translated by Greg Johnson.
The link to the original source can be found below.

Not being the work of a single man, liberalism was never presented
in the form of a unified doctrine. Various liberal authors have, at
times, interpreted it in divergent, if not contradictory, ways. Still, they
share enough common points to classify them all as liberals. These
common points also make it possible to define liberalism as a specific
school of thought. On the one hand, liberalism is an economic doctrine
that tends to make the model of the self-regulating market the
paradigm of all social reality: what is called political liberalism is simply
one way of applying the principles deduced from these economic
doctrines to political life. This tends to limit the role of politics as
much as possible. (In this sense, one can say that “liberal politics” is a
contradiction in terms.) On the other hand, liberalism is a doctrine
based on an individualistic anthropology, i.e., it rests on a conception
of man as a being who is not fundamentally social.

However, insofar as it is
based on individualism, liberalism tends to sever all social connections
that go beyond the individual. As for the market’s optimal operation,
it requires that nothing obstruct the free circulation of men
and goods, i.e., borders must be treated as unreal, which tends to dissolve
common structures and values. Of course this does not mean
that liberals can never defend collective identities. But they do so only
in contradiction to their principles.

The Pauline doctrine reveals a dualistic tension that makes the Christian, in his relationship to God, an “otherworldly individual”: to
become Christian implies in some way giving up the world. However,
in the course of history, the “otherworldly” individual gradually contaminated
worldly life. To the extent that he acquired the power to
make the world conform to his values, the otherworldly individual
progressively returned to the world, immersing himself in it and
transforming it profoundly.

The process was carried out in three main stages. Initially, secular
life was no longer rejected but relativized: this is the Augustinian synthesis
of the two cities. In the second stage, the papacy secularized itself
by assuming political power. Finally, with the Reformation, man
invested himself completely in the world, where he worked for the
glory of God by seeking material success that he interpreted as the
very proof of his election.
In this way, the principle of equality and individuality—which initially
functioned solely in the relationship with God and thus could
still coexist with an organic and hierarchical principle structuring the
social whole—was gradually brought down to earth, resulting in
modern individualism, which represents its secular projection. “In order
for modern individualism to be born,” writes Alain Renaut explicating
the theses of Louis Dumont, it was necessary for the individualistic
and universalist component of Christianity “to contaminate,” so
to speak, modern life to such an extent that gradually the two orders
were unified, the initial dualism was erased, and “life in the world
was reconceived as being able to conform completely to the supreme
value”: at the end of this process, “the otherworldly individual became
the modern worldly individual.”2

Organic society of the holist type then disappeared. In contemporary
terms, one passed from community to society, i.e., to common life
conceived as simple contractual association. The social whole no
longer came first, but rather individual holders of individual rights,
bound together by self-interested rational contracts.

Beginning in the eighteenth century,
the emancipation of the situated individual from his natural attachments
was routinely interpreted from the perspective of universal
progress as marking the accession of humanity to “adulthood.” Sustained
by this individualistic impulse, modernity was characterized
first and foremost as the process by which local and kinship groups,
and broader communities, are gradually broken down to “liberate the
individual,” and all organic relations of solidarity are dissolved.

In the modern sense of the term, individualism is the philosophy
that regards the individual as the only reality and takes him as the
principle of every evaluation. The individual is considered in himself,
in abstraction from his social or cultural context. While holism expresses
or justifies existing society in reference to values that are inherited,
passed on, and shared—i.e., in the last analysis, in reference
to society itself—individualism establishes its values independently of
society as it finds it. This is why it does not recognize the autonomous
status of communities, peoples, cultures, or nations. For it sees these
entities as nothing but sums of individual atoms, which alone have

This primacy of the individual over the community is simultaneously
descriptive, normative, methodological, and axiological. The individual
is assumed to come first, whether he is prior to the social in a
mythical representation of “prehistory” (the anteriority of the state of
nature), or simply has normative primacy (the individual is what is
worth more). Georges Bataille asserts that, “at the basis of every being,
there exists a principle of insufficiency.” Liberal individualism, on the contrary, affirms the full sufficiency of the singular individual. In liberalism,
man can apprehend himself as an individual without reference
to his relationship to other men within a primary or secondary
sociality. Autonomous subject, owner of himself, moved solely by his
particular interests, the individual is defined, in opposition to the person,
as a “moral, independent, autonomous and thus primarily nonsocial

In liberal ideology, the individual possesses rights inherent in his
“nature” entirely independent of social or political organization. Governments
are obligated to guarantee these rights, but do not establish
them. Being prior to all social life, they are not immediately correlated
to duties, because duties imply precisely that social life already exists:
there are no duties toward others if there are no others. Thus the individual
himself is the source of his own rights, beginning with the right
to act freely according to the calculation of his private interests. Thus
he is “at war” with all other individuals, since they are supposed to
act the same way in a society conceived as a competitive market.

Liberals insist particularly on the idea that individual interests
should never be sacrificed to the collective interest, the common good,
or the public safety, concepts that they regard as inconsistent. From
this idea it follows that only individuals have rights, while communities,
being only collections of individuals, have none of their own.

Such a society can be conceived either as the consequence of an initial
rational voluntary act (the fiction of the “social contract”) or as the result
of the systemic play of the totality of projects produced by individual
agents, a play regulated by the market’s “invisible hand,”
which “produces” the social as the unintentional result of human behavior.
The liberal analysis of the social rests, thus, either on contractualism
(Locke), recourse to the “invisible hand” (Adam Smith), or the
idea of a spontaneous order, independent of any intention (F. A.

Liberals developed the whole idea of the superiority of regulation
by the market, which is supposed to be the most effective, most rational,
and thus also the most just means to harmonize exchanges. At
first glance, the market is thus presented above all as just a “technique
of organization” (Henri Lepage). From an economic standpoint, it is at
the same time an actual place where goods are exchanged and a virtual
entity where in an optimal way the conditions of exchange—i.e.,
the adjustment of supply and demand and the price level—are

But liberals do not wonder about the origin of the market either.
Commercial exchange for them is indeed the “natural” model for all
social relations. From this they deduced that the market itself is also a
“natural” entity, establishing an order prior to any deliberation and
decision. Being the form of exchange most in harmony with human
nature, the market would be present at the dawn of humanity, in all
societies. One finds here the tendency of every ideology to “naturalize”
its presuppositions, i.e., to present itself, not for what it is, in fact
a construction of the human spirit, but as a simple description, a simple
transcription of the natural order. The state being correlatively rejected
as an artifice, the idea of the “natural” regulation of the social
by means of the market can then be imposed.

“A merchant,” Smith
writes in a famous passage, “. . . is not necessarily the citizen of any
particular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him from
what place he carries on his trade; and a very trifling disgust will
make him remove his capital, and together with it all the industry
which it supports, from one country to another.”13 These prophetic
lines justify the judgment of Pierre Rosanvallon, who sees Adam
Smith as “the first consistent internationalist.” “Civil society, conceived
as a fluid market,” adds Rosanvallon, “extends to all men and
allows them to transcend national and racial divisions.”

The market can indeed be regarded as a law—a
principle regulating the social order—without a legislator. Regulated
by the action of an “invisible hand,” which is inherently neutral because
it is not incarnated in concrete individuals, the market establishes
an abstract mode of social regulation based on allegedly objective
“laws” that make it possible to regulate the individual relations
where no forms of subordination or command exist. The economic
order would thus have to establish the social order, both orders being
conceived as emerging without being instituted.

Neo-liberals now dispute
the very concept of the public good. Hayek prohibited any comprehensive
approach to society on principle: no institution, no political
authority ought to set objectives that might question the efficiency
of the “spontaneous order.” Given this view, the only role that most
liberals agree to allow the state is guaranteeing the conditions necessary
for the free play of economic rationality to work in the market.
The state can have no goal of its own.

-exerted from here